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Various studies have examined the impact of labour
market institutions, such as unemployment benefits,
employment protection legislation (EPL), active
labour market policy,labour union density,and taxa-
tion of labour income on unemployment in Europe
(e.g., OECD 2006; Nickell and Layard 1999). The
OECD Job Strategy has suggested reforming rigid
labour market institutions to tackle the unemploy-
ment problem (OECD 1994). The European Com-
mission recommends the “flexicurity” approach,
more flexible labour markets combined with a satis-
factory level of security for employees, to adapt to
the challenges of globalisation and increased struc-
tural change. Denmark, Finland, and the Nether-
lands have been identified as successful countries,
which have carried out consistent and comprehen-
sive reform programs in the last few years (Brandt,
Burniaux and Duval 2005).
Austria is a country with a comparatively favourable
labour market performance. While fundamental
reforms of the labour market have not taken place,
smaller steps (intensified activation of the unem-
ployed,efforts to raise the retirement age,tightening
of the conditions under which job offers must be
accepted, etc.) have been the hallmark of the
Austrian policy. When compared to other countries,
Austria distinguishes itself with its high-quality
industrial relations. The strong involvement of the
social partners, which is reflected particularly in
wage policy as well as in labour market policy,is typ-
ical for Austria.
In 2002 Austria reformed its EPL regulations. The
reform replaced a conventional severance payments
system with a system of individual saving accounts.
The system is funded by employers via a monthly
untaxed payment of 1.53 percent of gross wages. In
the event of dismissal, workers have the option of
receiving severance payment drawn from their sav-
ings accounts or taking their accumulated balance to
the next job. Upon retirement, employees can claim
a cash payment or convert their entitlements into an
annuity. This reform of the severance pay law has
received international attention as an example for a
labour law measure supportive for employment
transitions (OECD 2006 and the European Commis-
sion 2006a).
The Austrian labour market 
In international comparison the Austrian labour
market situation is favourable, although a gradual
deterioration has occurred over the last 25 years.
Unemployment is traditionally low, the unemploy-
ment rate amounted to 4.7 percent in 2006.The em-
ployment rate is 70 percent and above the EU aver-
age. The Austrian labour market, at first glance,
exhibits a high rate of job turnover.In 2006 a total of
1,538 million dependent jobs were taken up and
1,469 million terminated (BMWA 2007). The aver-
age total dependent employment amounted to
3,161 million.This dynamic can be explained in large
part by the comparatively high seasonality of employ-
ment in Austria (Del Bono and Weber 2006).The two
dominating industries are construction and tourism,
which also experience the most dramatic seasonal
fluctuation in demand. This seasonal dynamic is
strengthened even more by the design of the unem-
ployment insurance system. In the absence of experi-
ence rating, unemployment insurance premiums are
the same for every sector of the Austrian labour mar-
ket. As a result seasonal industries are heavily subsi-
dized with a corresponding increase in seasonal fluc-
tuations and a higher job turnover. 35 percent
(557,000) of all positions taken up in 2006 were rein-
statements within the same company.Aggregate num-
bers also suggest that job turnover in Austria parallels
American rates. If, however, the sectoral composition
and the small establishment size are taken into
account, the figures for Austria are much lower
(Stiglbauer, Stahl, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller
2003). Measures of worker reallocations that do not
consider short-term flows indicate that the Austrian
labour market exhibits rather low dynamics in inter-
national comparison (Stiglbauer 2006).
EPL considers legal and administrative constraints
on worker dismissals, as well as severance payments
paid to dismissed employees. Figure 1 suggests that
Bei figure 3 stimmt die Farbe nicht. Kann erst geändert werden,
wenn Fr. Kunz wieder da ist.
* This paper draws heavily on Hofer (2006).
** Dr. Helmut Hofer is senior economist at the Institute for
Advanced Studies,Vienna.Austria is ranked in the middle of the OECD mem-
ber countries with respect to the overall strictness of
employment protection.1 Open-ended employment
contracts are the norm in Austria. Dismissals can
only be contested when the cause is either discrimi-
natory (e.g., gender-specific terminations or because
of union membership) or socially unfair, e.g., when
the dismissed employee would be more negatively
affected than a colleague in a similar position. The
partial indicator for regular employment relation-
ships measures the relevant notice periods, the
amount of possible severance pay, the estimated
court costs and indemnity expenses in the event of
an unjustifiable termination, as well as any possible
legal difficulties that would accompany the imple-
mentation of the termination. Due to the relatively
long notice period for white-collar workers, Austria
ranks in the middle of OECD members with respect
to this indicator.Notice periods differ between blue-
and white-collar workers. White-collar workers can
be given notice at the end of every quarter, at which
point the notice period can range from six weeks to
five months, depending upon the length of job
tenure. The notice period for blue-collar workers is
regulated by collective contracts. If the period is not
defined in the contract,it is 14 days by default.While
employment protection regulations seem relatively
strict on paper, actual practice is a different story
(Hofer and Winter-Ebmer 2006).
Only a relatively small number
of cases are brought before a la-
bour court – most of which end
in a settlement consisting of sev-
erance pay. These kinds of ap-
peals mainly occur when older
employees at a firm with a works
council are given notice of termi-
nation – besides these cases,
appeals are very uncommon.La-
bour regulations seem flexible
enough to keep the necessary
processes of reallocation from
being burdened with prohibi-
tively high costs.
The OECD 2006 advocated ma-
king EPL regulations more predictable and minimis-
ing the extent to which EPL results in inefficient
labour turnover. Severance payment can be a barri-
er to efficiency-enhancing labour reallocation by dis-
couraging workers from quitting their current jobs to
move to better jobs.The reform of severance pay in
Austria has been addressing this problem by reduc-
ing obstacles for worker mobility.
Severance pay law in Austria
Severance pay was introduced in Austria for white-
collar workers in 1921 and extended to all workers in
1979.Austria’s previous employment legislation stip-
ulated that employees in the private sector were
entitled to severance pay if their employment spell
lasted for at least three years without interruption
and was not terminated by the employee.2 Since the
1970s severance pay had to be paid to an employee
who left the company voluntarily – after having

































































































































































































































Regulation on temporary forms of employment
Specific requirements for collective dismissal
Protection of regular workers against (individual) dismissal
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2004).
OVERALL SUMMARY INDEX OF EPL STRICTNESS AND ITS MAIN 
COMPONENTS, 2003 scale 0–6
EPL: Employment protection legislation.
Countries are ranked from left to right in ascending order of the overall summary index. 
Figure 1
Table 1 
Amount of severance pay in the old system
Years of continuous ser-
vice inone company
Amount of severance 
pay (calculated from
final salary) 
Less than 3 years No entitlement
From 3  to 5  years 2  months’pay 
5 to 10  years 3  months’pay 
10 to 15  years 4  months’pay 
15 to 20  years 6  months’pay 
20 to 25  years 9  months’pay 
25 years and more 12 months’pay 
  Source: Compilation of the author.
1 The OECD summary indicator of the overall stance of employ-
ment protection legislation is a weighted average of three sub-indi-
cators on dismissal regulations, covering (1) regular employees, (2)
temporary employees and (3) collective dismissals. The summary
indicator ranges from 0 to 6 and increases with the strictness of
EPL (OECD 2004).
2 An exemption was made for construction workers. In order to
qualify they had to be employed for only 92 weeks during the pre-
vious three years, and not necessarily with only one employer.CESifo DICE Report 4/2007 43
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worked for at least ten years – to enter retirement.
The payment amount was based on the last gross
monthly salary and the length of job tenure. Starting
with two monthly wages after three years of job
tenure, payments increased with the duration of the
job up to a maximum value of one year’s income
after 25 years (Table 1). It was taxed at a low rate
(6 percent).
The payment had to be made as a lump sum directly
out of the employer’s cash flow. Within the book
accounting system of the enterprises, severance pay-
ments were recorded as regular wage increases.
Employers had to make provisions in their accounts
(book reserve schemes) for at least half of the sever-
ance pay entitlements that could fall due.The yearly
allocations to the position in the balance sheet
reduced the taxable income of the company.Overall,
the expenditures for severance payment in 1997
amounted to approximately 2.5 percent of the total
wage bill (BMWA 2000).
Reforming the system of severance pay in Austria
had been the focus of controversy for a long time
(e.g., EIRO 2001; Klec 2007). The previous system
was called into question for two main reasons.It was
criticised because of its impact in terms of inhibiting
mobility in the labour market and the restrictions on
entitlement to severance pay.For employees the pre-
vious system of severance pay law reduced incen-
tives to change employers as the employee lost the
entitlement to severance pay in the case of self-ter-
mination of the employment contract. The second
major problem of the old severance pay law was the
distribution of the entitlements among employees.
The Austrian Trade Union Federation has been
demanding the extension of severance pay entitle-
ment to cover not only dismissals but also voluntary
resignations and seasonal employment.According to
Kristen,Pinggera and Schön (2002) only one third of
all workers became entitled to severance payments.
The previous system also involved some drawbacks
for businesses,especially for small and medium-sized
enterprises (Kristen et al. 2002). Liquidity problems
could occur if the firms had to make simultaneous
severance payments.
Certain policy makers were in favour of turning
severance pay into occupational pensions. In the
coalition program 2000 the federal government
stated its intention to develop a three- pillar pen-
sion system in Austria.The government’s intension
was that the severance payment reform should con-
tribute to the expansion of the underdeveloped sec-
ond pension pillar.
A considerable amount of research has been carried
out to evaluate the impact of EPL on aggregate
labour market variables.EPL reduces the layoff rate
and unemployment incidence by making firing more
costly to employers and increases unemployment
duration because higher labour costs tend to weaken
job creation, the overall effect on unemployment is
ambiguous and apparently minimal in practice.
However, strict EPL tends to compromise the em-
ployment prospects for young workers, women and
the long-term unemployed (e.g.,OECD 2006;Young
2003;European Commission 2006b).High procedur-
al costs as well as the associated higher insecurity
among companies can have a negative effect on em-
ployment. Provisions for severance pay can, howev-
er, already be made for in the terms of wage negoti-
ations (e.g., Leonardi and Pica 2007).
Most studies on the impact of the Austrian severance
pay system are based on theoretical arguments (e.g.,
Walther 1999) or anecdotal evidence. For low-quali-
fied jobs the system created incentives for employers
to terminate employment spells early to avoid accu-
mulating severance pay claims that are not matched
by productivity gains. According to OECD (2001),
the propensity of employers to terminate employ-
ment peaks prior to employment durations associat-
ed with discretionary hikes in accumulated claims
for severance pay. Moreover, the system was biased
against labour supply in industries with over-propor-
tionate employment fluctuations due to structural
change or seasonality as in tourism.Card,Chetty and
Weber (2006) provide a profound empirical analysis
of the impact of eligibility for severance payment on
unemployment duration and subsequent job out-
comes. They use a regression discontinuity design,
comparing the search behaviour of individuals who
were laid off just before and just after the 36-month
cut-off for eligibility.
According to this study the hazard rate of finding a
new job during the first 20 weeks of the unemploy-
ment spell is 8 to 12 percent lower for individuals eli-
gible for severance pay. This longer unemployment
spell is not compensated via the quality of the subse-
quent job. Mean wages, job duration and other mea-
sures of job quality are unaffected by entitlement to
severance pay.Card et al.(2006) use a theoretical job
search model to derive the welfare consequences ofseverance pay. According to the model, a pure
wealth effect causes the reduced search intensity
without any efficiency costs.Furthermore,Card et al.
(2006) find no evidence for selective firing prior to
the 36-month-cutoff.
The reform of severance pay law
In mid-2001 Austria’s government announced its
intention to reform the country’s system of statutory
severance pay law. The aim was to extend entitle-
ment to a wider range of situations and to introduce
an option of using payments to fund occupational
pensions. Important details like required minimum
length of service for entitlement had already been
discussed at length. Finally, the government decided
to delegate the drafting of a new severance scheme
to the social partners. In October 2001, the social
partners reached a compromise and in June 2002 the
new severance pay law was adopted.
The severance pay system was changed by the
Betriebliches Mitarbeitervorsorgegesetz,also known
as the new severance pay law (“Abfertigung Neu”).
The new system became effective in January 2003. It
covers all employment contracts concluded after
December 2002. Employment contracts already in
place on the date remain, in principle, unaffected
until the end of the employment relationship.
However,the possibility of a transfer from the old to
the new severance payment law is provided.
Severance pay claims are shifted to and enforceable
by the so-called employee provision funds (“Mit-
arbeitervorsorgekassen”), which are legally inde-
pendent from the employers.
The employer is obliged to pay
a contribution amounting to
1.53 percent of gross wages
every month. The contributions
start in the second month of an
employment relationship and
end with its termination. Accu-
mulated entitlements rest in the
employee’s account until retire-
ment, unless the work contract
has been terminated by the
employer, which makes cash
payments admissible. Emplo-
yees may draw severance pay
only under the same entitlement
conditions as under the previous
scheme, and provided money
has been paid into the fund for three years.The con-
tribution periods of different employers will be
aggregated. Upon becoming eligible for payment,
the employee can choose between cash, further
investment at the same employee provision funds or
at the employee provision funds of the new employ-
er, or transferring the respective amount as a one-
time payment to a pension insurance fund. Upon
retirement, employees can either claim a cash pay-
ment or convert their entitlements into an annuity.
While the former is taxed at a rate of 6 percent,
annuities remain untaxed.
The reform extends the entitlement to severance pay
considerably.Entitlement starts after one month and
does not depend on how the contract was terminat-
ed or on job tenure. Instead of losing claim to sever-
ance pay in cases of self-termination, employees can
carry over the balance to the new employment rela-
tionship.
While in the old system the maximum level of sev-
erance payment is reached after 25 years of
employment with the same employer, under the
new system the claim increases progressively. The
employee provision funds invest the employers’
contributions in the capital market, therefore the
level of severance payment depends on the annual
net yield.Figure 2 shows the evolution of severance
pay claims in terms of the individual’s last monthly
wage in the old vs. the new scheme (Koman, Schuh
and Weber 2005).While in the old system severance
payments increased in stages and reached the max-
imum level after 25 years of employment with the
same employer, in the new system the severance
pay will rise continuously and reach the maximum
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value of the old system after 37 years of contribu-
tion. Note, however, these calculations assume a
rather high and unrealistic rate of net-return of
6 percent per annum.
For employment contracts concluded before Ja-
nuary 2003 the possibility of arranging a transfer
from the old to the new severance pay system has
been provided for. Figure 3 illustrates that only
27,000 persons have changed into the new sever-
ance pay system.
Up to now 2.3 million persons acquired claims in the
new severance pay system (Figure 3).Figure 4 shows
the share of all employees in the new system by
month. In August 2007 46 percent of the workers
were already linked to the new severance pay sys-
tem. 361,000 enterprises have concluded contracts
with the employee provision funds.
Employee provision funds
Nine privately managed compa-
nies were established to collect
the monthly contributions, in-
vest them on the capital market
and make severance payments
to employees who become eligi-
ble. The funds work on a for-
profit base and are allowed to
charge operating fees.Employee
provision funds are entitled to
retain an administrative fee of
1 percent up to 3.5 percent of
annual severance pay contri-
butions. Currently, actual fees
charged are mainly in the range
of 1.8 percent to 2.9 percent
(GPA 2006). Additionally the
employee provision funds can
charge up to 0.8 percent of the
invested capital as asset manage-
ment fee.
The employer concludes a con-
tract with one employee provi-
sion fund for all workers who
are in the new severance pay
system. The choice of the em-
ployee provision fund is decid-
ed via an employer/works coun-
cil agreement. In enterprises
without works council the employer decides in gen-
eral. Changing the employee provision fund is pos-
sible.Between 2004 and 2006 the assets managed by
employee provision funds increased from 365 mil-
lion EUR to 1.13 billion EUR.
In the new system the level of severance payment
depends on the performance of the employee provi-
sion funds on the capital market. Only the nominal
contribution paid by the employer is guaranteed by
law. The ministry of finance expected an average
annual net yield of 6 percent on the investment of
severance pay.In 2003 the employee provision funds
did not promise an investment yield higher than
between 3 percent and 4 percent. In order to com-
pete, they promoted their investment capacities. In
2004, 2005, and 2006 the employee provision funds
achieved an average annual net yield of 5 percent,
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Figure 4employee provision funds can invest in bank assets
(at most 25 percent at the same group of credit insti-
tutes), loans and credits, bonds, equities (at most
40 percent) and share certificates of investment
funds. In principle at most 50 percent can be invest-
ed in foreign currency and at most 10 percent in
bonds and equities of the same company. Table 2
shows the asset allocation of the employee provision
funds. In 2006 only 15 percent of the assets were
invested in equities. The employee provision funds
argue that a high return is only possible if the port-
folio contains more equities.Due to the possibility of
payouts, the investment horizon is relatively short.
Almost every second employee eligible for payment
opts currently for disbursement. Overall it is to be
expected that the amount of severance payment will
be lower compared to the old system.
Discussion
2.3 million employees have acquired entitlements in
the new severance pay system.The reform extended
the number of workers entitled to severance pay
considerably. However, the average severance pay
will be lower in the new system. Starting with 2008
the number of persons entitled to severance pay-
ment will further increase as the so-called Freie
Dienstnehmer, a hybrid status between employed
and self-employed, and the self-employed engaged
in trade will be included. Farmers will also have the
possibility to opt in the system.
The new severance pay system offers advantages for
employers and employees. For employers liquidity
problems due to simultaneous severance payments
are prevented and there is no uncertainty related to
the costs of severance pay at the time of hiring. For
the workers, job mobility costs are reduced because
they do not lose their entitlement to severance pay-
ment when quitting a job.The former severance pay
system was heavily criticised for reducing labour
mobility. The loss of entitlement to severance pay
created a strong incentive for workers with long job
tenures not to quit. The new severance pay system
eliminates this disincentive with respect to labour
mobility. Currently no study exists, which quantifies
the impact on actual labour mobility. It is very likely
that the impact is currently modest as almost all
workers with long tenure are still covered by the old
legislation. Furthermore, reducing labour mobility
may be justified if it supports investment in firm spe-
cific human capital.However,it is questionable if the
old system was an efficient tool for increasing the
qualifications of the workers,given that there was no
link between entitlement to severance pay and the
costs and the degree of optimal company-based
training.
Originally, the government did not wish to provide
for the possibility of paying severance pay directly to
employees on the termination of their employment
relationship, but favoured a model in which sever-
ance pay entitlement went purely to fund occupa-
tional pensions. In the end, the social partners and
the government agreed on a compromise where sev-
erance pay paid directly to employees on termina-
tion of their employment will be taxed at a flat rate
of 6 percent, whereas severance payments saved
towards a private pension will be tax-free. It was an
explicit hope of the government that the severance
payments reform would also contribute to the
expansion of the underdeveloped second pension
pillar in Austria. The reform replaces the former
defined-benefit, final-salary severance payments
scheme by a defined-contribution, fully funded sys-
tem.According to Koman et al.(2005) the severance
pay law reform is a first step toward the expansion of
the underdeveloped second pension pillar in Austria.
The contribution rate of 1.53 percent is,however,too
low to generate a significant second pillar retirement
income that could help to maintain current replace-
ment rates. Based on retirement income projections
and simulations of the pension reform for the blue
and white collar workers’ pension system, Koman et
al.(2005) concluded that an increase of the contribu-
tion rate up to 5 percent could already be a major
step toward a sufficient second pillar retirement
income.
The reform improves the role of the capital market
in Austria and helps to strengthen the funded pillar
of the pension system. However, the possibility of
claiming cash payments after job termination, which
decreases the expected return on the capital market,
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and the relative low contribution rate imply that the
new system may not generate a sufficient second pil-
lar retirement income. One should note, that the
available evidence indicates that disbursement is
preferred to acquiring pension claims by a consider-
able number of workers.
As a result of the new provisions, many more
employees are now eligible for severance pay,in par-
ticular employees with short-term employment.One
explicit aim of the Austrian reform was to create
more fairness in the distribution of severance pay-
ments among employees. In order to evaluate the
distributional effects of the Austrian reform Koman
et al. (2005) performed an empirical analysis on a
cross section of completed job spells of different
durations for which they compared severance pay in
the two schemes.
According to the simulations, severance payments
will be 35 percent lower in the new system compared
to the old scheme in the sample mean. Due to the
more pronounced effects of the new scheme those
groups who were disadvantaged in the old scheme
will be even more so in the new (Koman et al.2005).
Mean payment according to both schemes differs
mostly for women, young, and blue-collar workers.
Note that Koman et al. (2005) had to make two cru-
cial assumptions. First, they did not observe com-
plete individual employment careers and hence can-
not say anything about the accumulation of sever-
ance payments during an individual’s working life-
time. Second, as Koman et al. (2005) had no infor-
mation on the reason for ending the employment
spell, they assumed no voluntary job terminations.
Overall, there are clear hints that the level of sever-
ance payments in the new system will be lower than
in the old system. This is, of course, only true for
workers who did receive severance payments based
the previous legislation. The reform unquestionably
extends to a considerable degree the number of
workers entitled to severance pay.
Conclusions
Overall, the reform of the severance pay system in
Austria was successful. The new system provides
advantages for employees and employers. From the
viewpoint of the employers, the (expected) costs of
dismissal – which are lower than with the previous
regulations – are already known from the start of
employment. For employees, the mobility-hamper-
ing loss of severance pay in cases of resignation is no
longer relevant. The new severance pay system will
enhance external flexibility. One can, however, criti-
cize the fact that the manner in which the employ-
ment contract is ended has no influence on the
amount and form of the employees’ right to sever-
ance pay – in other words, the new severance pay
system in Austria contains no elements of a layoff
tax. The aim of a layoff tax is to make firms inter-
nalise the costs of excessive job turnover. Moreover,
the possibility of early payouts implies that employ-
ee provision funds cannot place a high percentage of
the capital in long-term investment schemes, there-
fore limiting potential yields.
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